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Innis. McLuhan and Marx 
Carolyn Marvin 
The University of Pennsylvania 
To help sort out the useful theoretical similarities and distinctions between Innis, 
McLuhan, and Marx, this brief comment considers some unresolved problems in 
how Innis conceptualizes the logic of historical process and the impact of media on 
social organization. The comment argues that certain fundamental notions in 
Innis's work, including his categories of spatial and temporal bias, inaccurately 
analyze key features of the historical interaction of media with social organization, 
and in particular shortchange the flexibility and persistence of oral-gestural modes 
of communication. 
Harold Innis is nothing if not sweeping, and the title of this paper 
reflects something of the theoretical breadth his work has always 
had. That work is a field on which all history is allowed to play. It 
follows that the only conceivably more satisfying development would 
be to enlarge the field and the possibilities of the game. To set up a 
comparison between Marx and Innis is to do just that. 1 
Between them there are at least superficial similarities. Both at-
tempt to set in motion a historical logic of material causes which 
expose our imagined progress as an illusion. In both accounts our 
consciousness turns on us, and turns out to be full of destruction, 
death, and injustice. Innis's model of media competition and 
monopoly borrows an economic vocabulary, and he entertains a vis-
ion of unalienated communication which in some respects resembles 
Marx's vision of unalienated labor. 
Visible Language, XX 3 (Summer 1986), pp355-359. Author's address: Annenburg School, University of Penn-
sylvania, Philadelphia PA 19104. © Visible Language, 2643 Eaton Road, Cleveland OH 44118. 
1600 120' 800 400 00 400 800 1200 1600 
I n ~n i ~s ' ~s w 0 r lk i 3 a 
- -
. .. 
-
1 1 ,(~ 1 C1 10 In IW h 1 c 11 a l J 
~ ..: ..... ... 
-
-'"' • r ..: 
- -
, 1 
-
. . 
-
-l 
l J 1 LJ L- 1\.J 1 y 1 l:'i d .l .l llJ w e rlJ 
v 
+- ,........_ ~ I ,.... ., 
~ lJ l.J .1 a v • ~ 
400 
00 
356 Visible Language XX 3 Summer 1986 
Self-contained grand theorists do not require one another for comple-
tion since they already aspire to be complete. It can be interesting to 
discover what unsuspected incompletenesses emerge in their com-
parision, however. If they seem after all to be compatible or com-
plementary, we can believe either that some universal theories share 
similar characteristics, or that reality truly exhibits the same face to 
each lens even from different foci. Such comparisons are not my 
purpose. Nor is it my intention to join the ranks of Marxian critics, or 
even to make a choice among the three theorists under discussion. 
The question I wish to address is how adequate a framework Innis's 
theory provides for Western history. My comments are offered in 
that spirit. 2 
Innis's intuitive appeal is very great to anyone for whom communica-
tion is a central intellectual preoccupation. He offers an apparently 
powerful media theory to criticize the world we live in. His notion 
that media forms shape political institutions and cultural habits of 
mind is not quite a notion of original sin, but something nearly as 
intractable. The influence of those forms is so pervasive, it is Innis's 
object to show, that the intermediate solutions in terms of which 
most political discourse is conducted will always fail because they do 
not touch the means by which we structure our world and our associ-
ations with others in it. This rejection of the terms of contemporary 
culture is a radical posture. Lacking remedies, however, and with a 
view that the most moral communication is a state from which we 
have historically fallen and to which there is no returning, Innis's 
outlook is pessimistic and deeply conservative. 
As the means of production are critical for Marx, so the means of 
communication are critical for Innis. What governs the potency of 
voice, stone, clay, parchment, papyrus, and paper are their relative 
attributes of durability and portability. These attributes select vic-
tors among competing historical powers by conferring relative ad-
vantages of range and longevity in the exercise of authority. But 
Innis offers no notion of Communicating Man equivalent to Economic 
Man to explain exactly how communication structures mind and soci-
ety, since durability and portability account (if they do) only for 
media and not at all for communication. Nor does Innis ever give us a 
definition of medium which makes it possible to construct a notion of 
what is not a consequence of its action in any of its variety of incarna-
tions. With so little of the essential theoretical scaffolding made exp-
licit, communicative consequences are assumed but never investi-
gated. 
Does it matter? It does indeed. While Innis is praised for a political 
economy of communication that reaches beyond newspapers and 
broadcasting to pre-industrial media, and especially to speech, it 
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remains unclear why some social artifacts are media in his scheme 
and others are not. Why aren't clothing, art, architecture, etiquette, 
cuisine, transportation, and all forms of economic activity modes of 
communication? Or, if stone and clay are media, where is the analysis 
of the civic building or the temple as significant communicative ex-
pression, or of the Greek amphitheater, or even the modern sky-
scraper? Social forms designated as media exert their influence on 
historical experience over other candidate media by no identifiable 
principle. Nor does Innis demonstrate why the same media, available 
to different groups, fail to confer the same power or veneration on 
them all, or what it really means, in the multi-media history of the 
world, to label a medium as "dominant." 
According to Innis, one of the important things that distinguishes 
one medium from another is how difficult it is to move each one 
across space. Since media artifacts do not move themselves, systems 
of communication are functionally indivisible from systems of trans-
portation. But Innis neglects this dimension of the story entirely. It 
would be difficult to argue that mere portability automatically gives 
rise to suitable modes of transport, or that media modes can be 
historically more potent than the efficiency of the systems of trans-
portation on which they depend. 
A close reading of some of Innis's work, moreover, suggests a tech-
nological plasticity at odds with his theory. Media which are space-
binding on some historical occasions turn out to be time-binding on 
others. If the theory supposes that political institutions and cultural 
dispositions are transformed through modal characteristics of media, 
the list of features explaining changes in politics and culture cannot 
legitimately include differences in political and cultural organization 
from society to society. Without acknowledging that he does so, Innis 
invokes such differences himself. But because his theory requires 
him to ignore them as much as possible, he is unable to notice a 
number of lines of inquiry they suggest. 
In this much too brief critique of Innis's theory, I will allow myself a 
single hasty example to illustrate the kind of significant cultural dis-
crimination at which I think Innis is aiming, but which escapes the 
net of modal analysis. For Innis, a man of the twentieth century, 
print and paper present a single spatially biased face. But a spate of 
detailed and excellent recent scholarship on the history of literacy in 
the West has demonstrated that literate modes (which exemplify 
other organized uses of other communications media as well) offer 
opportunities for complex expressions of social, political, and 
economic stratification. In eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
France, and not alone there, writing and reading were often cultur-
ally dissociated. Reading was the mode of receptivity to the word of 
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God, and to salvation. Its claims were universal, for if even the poor 
could at least read, God would take care of the rest. Skill in reading 
accompanied by an absence of skill in writing was a form of non-
scholastic, religiously grounded, usually familial acculturation espe-
cially prevalent among women. Skill in writing, accompanied often 
by poor reading skill, belonged to the civil domain of males. It was 
gradually transformed from a rare and learned art to a convenience 
to a status symbol. Reading belonged to religion, morality, and 
women; writing was a male apprenticeship of utility. 3 Here is a dif-
ference in modal practice and cultural consequence to which only an 
analysis that admits cultural shapes is sensitive, and which it is the 
thrust of Innis's framework to defeat. 
Equally puzzling is the fact that Innis never takes half his theory, the 
half he likes best, seriously enough. Closely examined, his notion of 
time-binding turns out to be nothing more than a unique case of 
limited transmission. He gives no attention to retrieval and storage 
systems as media attributes of some variety and importance, and of 
something more, real effect. Though memory depends on selection 
and significance and not merely on durability, Innis treats neither of 
these. Nor does he discuss traditional memory objects as media. 
This brings us to some conceptual difficulties of the distinction bet-
ween space- and time-binding, a distinction which provides Innis 
with the engine he needs to move history and make its consequences 
intelligible. Innis never explains why a medium may be classified 
either as space- or time-binding, but not both at once. A little reflec-
tion will tell us that powerful media have always "bound" both space 
and time. Elizabeth Eisenstein makes this clear in her discussion of 
the impact of printing. It is arguable that with its instantaneous and 
expansive reach and its powerful memory, computing will have his-
torical consequences of the same magnitude. 
McLuhan was perhaps more consistent than his colleague mentor in 
making a medium of everything, though that strategy, as McLuhan 
developed it, sacrificed both force and historical precision. Innis's 
implicit definition of media appeals to the characteristics and settings 
of messages, and to knowledge of their authors, a discouraging state 
of affairs for a theory which claims to be medium-based. Although 
oral tradition is not limited in Innis's discussion to particular kinds of 
content, he treats clay, stone, parchment, and papyrus as media only 
when they carry the bureaucratic inscriptions of religious or secular 
elites. Paper, like speech, is allowed more popular and more cultur-
ally diverse content. All this seems fairly arbitrary. And what are we 
to make of the fact that what Innis offers as a radical revision of 
history disturbs none of our previous periodizations, nor even any of 
the labels by which we designate (and therefore begin to explain) 
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epochs and peoples. It is as though the arena of history were other-
wise uncontested, and historians have simply misnamed its underly-
ing "causes." Even assuming this to be the case (I suspect few his-
torians do), there would be none but aesthetic reasons to prefer 
Innis's account except that it appeals to us, since he does not show us 
what we can do with his theory that has not already been done by 
scholars working without media explanations. 
If Innis offers us neither theoretical rigor nor close historical detail, 
what keeps the flame alive? I think it is his ability to see communica-
tions technology as something more than transparent extra-historical 
transmitting and recording devices, and his striking early intuition 
that modes of communication have powerful effects on social organi-
zation, even though he does not offer a clear historical account of this 
process. He speaks for something in all of us in his disillusionment 
with the attenuation and dilution of personal experience by com-
munication made remote for social control. He also assumes, using 
Marx's vocabulary for Innis's problematic, that only oral communica-
tion is unalienated communication. But the consequences of making 
meaning alienated or exteriorized - what in other circles is called 
the problem of interpretation- which Innis does not trust in some 
media he does not notice in others, especially speech. 
The idea that modes of communication propagate and reflect the 
interests of specific classes and groups is a powerful theme of con-
temporary scholarship. Innis was one of the first to make the case 
that elites use the tools of communication to pursue power, and 
equally that media may become vehicles to subvert entrenched 
elites. 
Perhaps neither Innis, McLuhan, nor Marx, but the same problem as 
always: resisting the temptation to substitute grand theory for pa-
tient analysis of the complexity of human imagination and circum-
stances that the residue of social forms in historical records reveals. 
1. For reasons of parsimony, I am collapsing McLuhan into Innis for this discussion. 
I agree with Jim Carey that as a "student" of Innis, McLuhan attempted (with less 
success) to do for psychological perception what Innis attempted to do for institu-
tional organization. 
2. Elsewhere I have developed some of these arguments in greater detail. See 
Marvin, "Space, Time, and Captive Communications History," in Mary Mander, ed., 
Communications in Transition: Issues and Debates in Current Research (New 
York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 20-38. 
3. Francois Furet and Jacques Ozouf, Reading and Writing, Literacy in France 
from Calvin to Jules Ferry (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 
1977; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
